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Abstract 
Real investment in plant, equipment, and working capital for individual firms and for 
the economy in aggregate, will be optimal only if the primary market for financial 
capital operates efficiently. The primary market, in turn, requires an efficient 
secondary market. Liquidity is an important measure of operational efficiency of the 
secondary market. We study the combined effects of characteristics of firms and 
trading mechanisms on liquidity. 
In our research, we consider one characteristic of firms, i.e. the firm size as 
represented by market capitalization, and three trading systems whose classification is 
primar~ly based on the role of intermediary. 
Our choice of the firm size is based on the fact that its effect on liquidity is major 
when compared to the other characteristics of firms. Our research design controls only 
this factor and assumes the effects of other factors on liquidity to be minimal. 
We use samples of stocks from the Paris Bourse continuous-.4 trading system, KYSE 
and NASDAQ markets. Paris Bourse continuous-A system represents a pure order 
driven / agency market and provides liquidity through a limit order book. NYSE 
represents a combination market where a monopoly dealer competes with the limit 
order book to provide liquidity NASDAQ market represents a pure dealership system 
where multiple dealers compete with each other to provide liquidity. 
The purpose of this research is twofold. First, to establish the economic arguments 
in order to formulate the hypothesis that would identify the suitability of stocks, based 
on the firm size, for a particuiar trading mechan~sm in enhancing liquidity and arrive 
at the testable propositlons Second, to empirically evaluate the propositlons and draw 
conclusions. 
Recent stud~es show that the quoted bid-ask spread covers three costs viz. order 
processing costs? inventory holding costs and adverse information costs. Our 
theoretical arguments are based on the combined effects of firm size and trading 
mechanisms on these three cost components of the quoted spread We consider the 
effects of firm size and trading mechanisms on the three cost components and then 
arrive at their net effects. An analysis of the characteristics of large firms versus small 
firms and the different trading systems aid us in quantifying the effects of these two 
factors on the three cost components. From this we formulate our hypothesis and 
testable propositions. 
First, we consider the effects of firm size on the three cost componenis. In the 
absence of informational trading, value of stocks traded would be in proportion to the 
value of shares outstanding. Large firms with higher value of outstanding shares 
record higher dollar volume than small firms do in any ordinary trading day. Order 
processing costs represent the clerical costs of carrying out the transactions, the cost 
of the dealer's time and the cost of physical communications and office equipment 
necessary to carry out the transactions. These costs are fixed in nature and so costs per 
dollar of stock price reduces as the value of trading increases. Hence larger firms with 
more dollar volume of trading incur substantially lower order processing costs per 
dollar of stock price when compared to smaller firms. This effect happens irrespective 
of the trading mechanism. 
Large firms tend to have a high level of momtoring and public information 
d~sseminatlon by securities analysts and others [Bhide (1993) and Ho and Michaely 
(1988)J Moreover large firms disseminate information about themselves to the 
market. This greater degree of informational effic~ency helps all the market 
participants to have access to information cheaply in the case of large firms and 
reduces the adverse information costs mespective of the trading mechanism. This is 
not the case with smaller firms. 
Estimates by George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991), Hasbrouck (1988), Madhavan 
and Smidt (1991), and Stoll (1989) suggest that inventory holding costs appear to be 
relatively small. Further the inventory holding cost component depends on a number 
of factors viz. trade volume, initial inventory level: dealer's wealth, relative risk 
aversion, r ~ s k  of the stock and expected holding period. So we expect this component 
to show a mixed trend across different sized stocks in any trading system. 
In essence, due to the effects of firm slze on the cost components: larger firms 
experience lower total cost and smaller firms experience higher total cost. 
Design of the trading mechanisms also affects the order processing costs, inventory 
holding costs and adverse information costs. Affleck-Graves, Hegde, and Mdler 
(1994) argue that by promoting greater direct interaction of public orders, auction 
based exchange trading reduces the order processing cost component of the quoted 
spread relative to the multiple dealer market. Further they argue that unlike multiple 
dealers in the pure dealer market who are able to share the inventory risk, the 
nlonopoly dealer faces a large cost of absorbing a given imbalance in order flow, 
which increases the inventory holding cost component of the quoted spread in a 
coinbination market. We share a similar view So we expect lower order processing 
costs in pure order driven and combmation markets when compared to a pure dealer 
market. The mventory holding costs would be more in the case of the combination 
market though the overall contribution by this component to the quoted spread may be 
small. 
As far as the role of adverse information cost component In each of the markets is 
considered, our argument runs on the following lines. In a combination market a 
single monopoly dealer with the sole responsibility of making market assumes greater 
risk. This added risk compels him to gather information in a firm in which he makes 
market. The information he conveys through the quotes sends sufficient signals about 
the stock he makes market. This effect reduces the adverse infonnation costs in a 
combmation market. Though in a pure dealer market the designated dealers constantly 
gather information in order to minimize their informational handicap with respect to 
informed traders, the mult~ple signals contain enough "noise" to increase the adverse 
information. We feel this noise creation in a pure dealer market puts ~tself in a less 
advantageous position even when compared to a pure agency market where there are 
no dealers 
The order processing costs and inventory holding costs are to a large extent within the 
control of the market participants. On the other hand, the firm influences adverse 
information costs to a large extent. Hence we expect the adverse information cost 
component to be the major cost component followed by the order processing costs in 
any market across different firm sizes. 
The combinat~on market has a distinct advantage over the other two systems as far as 
the two major components (i.e. adverse infonnation and order processing cost 
v i  
coinponents) are concerned. Consequently the toral cost ivould be lob in a 
combination market. 
We conclude that the trading mechan~sms differ in providing liqu~dity and the 
con?bination market has an edge over the other two markets. 
The combined effects of firm size and trading mechanisms on the different costs can 
be summarized as below. Large firms experience very low total cost in all the three 
trading systems. The advantage of a combination market does not make any 
significant difference over the other two trading systems, as the total cost is already 
very low. So large firms provide liquidity irrespective of the trading mechanism. 
The difference arises only in the case of small firms. As the total cost of making 
market for the small firms is high. the advantage of the combination market is more 
pronounced. So we expect the combination market to offer highest liquidity and the 
multiple dealer market to provide the least liquidity. 
The practical implication of our hypothesis is that a combination market like the 
NYSE, where a monopoly dealer competes with the limit order book, provides higher 
liquidity than the other two types of trading systems, irrespective of the firm size. 
To test the above hypothesis we formulate a series of testable propositions and 
empirically evaluate them. We use the Stoll (1989) methodology to decompose the 
bid-ask spread into its components. We use the execution cost measure developed by 
Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) to estimate liquidity. The empirical results support 
our hypothesis. 
